Th e article analyzes the concept of political will and the role of the population in the battle with high-level corruption in post-communist Ukraine. We start with the assertion that political will in the battle with corruption is derivative of the character of the interaction between the population and the state, and in particular, to what extent the population adopts a "patron-orientation" to the political leadership of the country and holds them accountable. Accordingly, to analyze the strength and dynamics of political will, we suggest researching the way in which the population views the authorities rather than the personality of political leaders. We use a multi-disciplinary approach for understanding political will by proposing to look at it as a combination of political "want", "can", and "must" in the battle with corruption. In the methodological part of the paper, we examine quantitative and qualitative approaches to studying political will. We lay out an empirical analysis based on 14 focus groups which were conducted with representatives of various social layers of the population in four Ukrainian cities in May 2015. Analyzing the narratives makes it possible to defi ne empirical indicators, which can be used for researching political will, particularly the age and regional distribution of the participants in the focus groups.
Introduction
In Ukraine, corruption has become a systemic feature of society 1 , reducing economic growth, undermining democratic institutions, and weakening the provision of security. Comparative indexes of corruption prepared by Transparency International, the World Bank, and other international organizations consistently show Ukraine to be the most corrupt country in Europe and among the most corrupt countries in the world. Extensive anti-corruption campaigns encouraged by the leading international political and fi nancial institutions have so far not led to substantial progress, according to recent polls of the Ukrainian population 2 . Th e relatively small amount of success in fi ghting corruption in Ukraine is often attributed to the "lack of political will" 3 . For example, Transparency International-Ukraine (TI) noted in its report on the period from October 2014 to May 2015 that "Ukraine has achieved notable progress in reforming anti-corruption legislation, but on the other hand there is lack of political will from the Cabinet of Ministers, the President and the Verkhovna Rada to implement the new laws" 4 . Similarly, Taras Kuzio declares that "there is a near total absence of political will among Ukrainian politicians to seriously combat corruption (Kuzio, 2015, p. 326) . " Th e presence of political will can also be used to explain reform success where there is more visible progress than in Ukraine. According to the World Bank analysis, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was uniquely successful in Georgia because of his "strong political commitment, backed by the comprehensiveness, pace, boldness, and sequencing of the reforms and, most important, the strong role of the executive in implementing them (World Bank, 2012, p. 11). " Working within this framework, observers oft en point out that asserting the right kind of political will for the situation is crucial. As investigative journalist turned member of parliament, Mustafa Nayyem, points out, "It is important that this [political] will appear before the people, out of despair, seek to bring a Ukrainian Pinochet to power" 5 . For Ukraine, political will is the missing element in the traditional anti-corruption triangle -strong political will, mobilized civil society, and independent mass media. Even though it is widely recognized that Ukraine currently has a strong civil society and a developed independent media, the country is not able to successfully fi ght corruption in the absence of strong political will.
Despite the recognized importance of political will for eff ectively fi ghting corruption, the concept is poorly developed both in political science and in practical managerial applications. Frequently, the phenomenon of will is viewed from a psychological perspective and is conceived as the leadership ability and personal motivation (or internally driven initiative) of specifi c politicians 6 . At the other extreme, political will is seen as the entire complex of individual, organizational, and institutional elements of the system of state management (e.g., Brinkerhoff 1999). Most oft en, however, the term "political will" is used without any explanation, as a term that presumably makes sense in and of itself. Typically, political will is seen as some sort of impulse for anti-corruption reforms coming from the supreme echelons of authority, the head of state, or the political establishment. Given these wide interpretations, the term leaves numerous questions unanswered: What is the nature of political will as a key anti-corruption tool? What are the sources and drivers of political will? To what extent are they able to strengthen or weaken the realization of anti-corruption reforms? Is it possible to measure political will? Can you infl uence it?
In this article, we try to answer these questions from a multi-disciplinary perspective. We base our analysis on the assertion that in the post-communist, neopatrimonial states, the main (and oft en only) drivers of political will are external, not internal, coming from society rather than the individual motivations of a particular political leader or from the institutional capacity of the state. Th erefore, to defi ne the concept of political will in the battle against corruption, it is necessary to place the idea of political will within the broader context of society (Migdal, 2001 ). Our argument is based on the thesis that strong political will asserted by the authorities is the result of a high level of political will within the population, which is able to monitor and hold their authorities accountable in implementing a set of anti-corruption reforms.
Th e article begins with an analysis of the various approaches to understanding political will. We show that existing approaches undervalue the role of society in the formation of political will. Building on the institutional conception of political will proposed by political scientists (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012) , and the practically oriented governance approach proposed by Malena (2009) , we see the political will of the authorities in implementing anti-corruption reforms as derivative of (or a mirror refl ection of) the political will of the population. From this perspective, the political will of the population is not only and exclusively through the activity of civil society organizations and the strength of direct political pressure on the authorities, but also in the character of the way that society perceives its authorities' political position, in the recognition of their own ability to infl uence the authorities, and in the implementation of anti-corruption reforms. In this context, the most important type of empirical research regarding political will focuses on society and the population rather than the political establishment and NGOs.
Th e methodological part of the article operationalizes the concept of political will. It examines the opportunities for quantitative and qualitative approaches to researching the given phenomenon. We propose an analytical framework for the further development of instruments for quantitative research and also examine the opportunities for qualitative research of political will. In this article, we focus on developing the qualitative analysis. Our qualitative work is based on 14 focus groups conducted with representatives of various social groups from the populations of four Ukranian cities in the spring of 2015. In the concluding section, we discuss the theoretical contribution of this approach for empirical research examining the phenomenon of political will in the battle with corruption and analyze its methodological possibilities and limitations.
Political Will: Defi nitions and Approaches As we noted above, the concept of political will is extremely popular in explaining the success or failure of anti-corruption reforms. Defi ning political will as the internal motivation of a political leader, combining psychological qualities and individual interests, limits the explanatory potential of the concept of political will particularly in analyzing the anti-corruption reforms undertaken in the aft ermath of colored revolutions in post-communist countries.
Post-revolutionary politicians do not automatically have the motivation to fi ght corruption, for the simple reason that politicians who are supposed to implement anti-corruption reforms in post-communist states are oft en personally involved in oligarchic networks and pursue their own private interests which do not necessarily match an anti-corruption agenda (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). As institutional scholars have pointed out, it does not make sense to rely on the charitable inclinations of politicians to carry out necessary reforms (Hale, 2016) . Th e anti-corruption eff ort to reform state governance which started in Ukraine aft er the Euromaidan revolution is a good illustration for this statement. Despite the fact that President Petro Poroshenko came to power in the wake of a popular uprising aimed largely at replacing the previous political system with a vaguely defi ned "European" alternative, his political will to fi ght corruption is limited by his own personal fi nancial and institutional interests. At the same time, he has laid out a variety of reforms and many institutional changes are being implemented. Under such conditions, one can assume that the contradictory character of the political will of the current political leadership in Ukraine is caused by the clash of public-driven versus politically and individually driven incentives and pressures. On the one hand, there are expectations on the part of the general public that provided Poroshenko with a mandate of trust in the post-Maidan elections, on the other hand, entrenched interests (or perhaps just a lack of interest in exerting the enormous eff ort required to develop and implement reforms) that can block reforms remain in place.
Another disadvantage of the individualistic approach is that it is hard to measure political will when it is defi ned in such black box leadership terms. An eff ective approach to measuring political will seeks to better take into account the motivations for leadership behavior and the context within which the leaders operate. Scholars working on the sub-Saharan African countries have developed such a theory (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012 ). At the micro-level, Persson and Sjostedt advocate using a principal-agent theory. Under this framework, a country's popu-lation represents the principal and the elected politicians are their agents. Rather than seeing political will as a "black box, " this theory Posits that the behavior of leaders is guided by the opportunity and incentive structure they face, and that this opportunity and incentive structure should, in turn, be expected to vary considerably depending on the degree to which the citizens are willing and able to control the leaders. In societies in which citizens take on the role of being a "principled principal, " leaders should be expected to have fewer opportunities and incentives to act opportunistically compared to societies in which the citizens are not willing or able to take on such a role (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012) . (emphasis added)
In other words, the degree to which citizens are willing to exercise their citizenship rights to form associations and individually exert oversights of their leaders determines to what extent the leaders are able to engage in high level corruption. Th e political will to address corruption then is a function of public eff orts. Robert Johnston came to a similar conclusion with his argument that "lasting corruption control requires deep democratization -not building democracy in an electoral or constitutional sense, but rather enabling and encouraging citizens to check abuses of wealth and power through political advocacy of their own interests (Johnston, 2014 , p. xii). "
Persson and Sjostedt's article makes a real contribution because the authors argue that political will is not just voluntaristic leadership behavior, but depends on the characteristics of the society, and in particular, the legitimacy of the state, namely, the state in people's perceptions.
Th is focus on society takes us farther than methodologies that emphasize the state. For example, international organizations, such as Transparency International and the World Bank, which are actively involved in anti-corruption campaigns in post-Soviet states, are more interested in the eff ectiveness of implementing anticorruption reforms and state management in general. From a governance point of view, PW is closely connected with implementation capacity, "and what may look to outsiders as a lack of political will to advance certain reforms may actually be a symptom of insuffi cient government capacity" (TI Guide, р. 6). Th e main problem is seen as the lack of certainty and resources to implement reforms. From this point of view, even politicians with good intentions to implement reforms would not try to do this because they are not sure that they possess enough resources and support from "all stakeholders" for this complicated enterprise. From the governance logic, in order to strengthen political will, it is important to mobilize stakeholders' support and organizational/institutional resources.
In further developing the concept of political will, the views on the nature of political will proposed by (Malena, 2009 ) in her research on participatory governance are useful. She disaggregated the concept into three elements, defi ning political will as the sum of "political want, " "political can" and "political must. " Further developing this construct with regard to the battle against corruption, we can suggest that "political want" to undertake a given action is essentially political motivation, "political can" represents capacity (organizational, institutional, etc.) to undertake that action, and "political must" implies some compulsion to undertake this action. We argue that in a neopatrimonial state, such as Ukraine, the main active element for political will in the battle with corruption is "political must, " which is activated exclusively under external pressure. An important source of pressure comes from international organizations, but a stable, long-term eff ect is possible only when society is exerting the pressure. Th us, to research the level and dynamics of political will it is necessary to focus not on the psychological qualities of political leaders, but on society, and in particular, the mutual relationship between society and the state.
Political Will: Public Perspective
Our analysis draws on the traditional argument that successful anti-corruption reform is based on the presence and interaction of three crucial elements: strong political will, mobilized civil society, and independent mass media. However, we argue that another important element, which is missing here, is the general public. Common people usually attract researchers' attention during revolutions and studies focus on the role of mass protests in the revolutionary change of political regimes (Onuch, 2014; Zelinska, 2015) . However, aft er the revolution, when it comes to the implementation of reforms, the focus of analysis usually shift s to state institutions, civil society organizations and the role of social players such as the media. Although public participation is seen by scholars as a critical condition of building trustworthy states in transforming societies (Rose-Ackerman, 2004), this concept has never been applied to the analysis of political will.
Civil society is supposed to play the role of intermediary between the state and individual citizens (Greene, 2014) . However, previous research shows that the link between civil society organizations and the general public is still problematic in Ukraine, which makes the situation look similar to the aft ermath of the Orange revolution. NGOs oft en live in their own world, obtaining fi nancing from Western and other donors, but oft en lacking strong connections to members of the public. Some have described this situation as "NGOcracy" (Lutsevych, 2013, p. 4) .
In this paper, we will look at the political will to fi ght corruption and implement reforms in Ukraine from the people's perspective. Political will does not work without popular support and pressure on the country's top politicians, who must defi ne and implement policy. We proceed from the assumption that the state of the population's political will and its dynamics serve as an indicator of the level and changes in the political will of the authorities in the battle with corruption. Following the patron-client model proposed by Persson and Sjostedt, we can say that the more that the population sees itself as the "patron" (and not the client), namely that it is the one that holds power, the greater the political will for carrying out reforms. Using the patron-client analytical frame is necessary to emphasize the vector of power relations -in the citizen-politician duo, the citizen should hold a position of power in relation to elected politicians. Th e category of political will refl ects the extent to which the population understands this power position.
In this way, we study political will in combatting corruption by examining the extent to which the population sees itself as a patron in its relationship with the authorities. Understandably, the most obvious expressions of the population's political will are political actions, protests, and the like which work through the instrument of direct political pressure. Despite all their importance, protests in neopatrimonial states do not always refl ect the real state of social consciousness. Th e participation of simple citizens in protests presupposes many cultural, historical, social, and political factors. Changes in the way that the population understands political institutions or states do not always fi nd immediate expression in the form of political actions. Th erefore, to analyze the political will of the population (in realizing anti-corruption reforms) it is important to research a society's dominant relationship with its political institutions and politicians and the understanding of citizens of themselves as subjects in political relations. Th e character of the population's attitudes toward the authorities does not exert direct political pressure, but in the fi nal analysis sets the level of institutional expectations from society in relation to the existing authorities; these expectations are no less important a factor of political infl uence than political protests and actions.
Measuring Political Will: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches
Researching political will according to the methods proposed above can proceed with both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Here we lay out a guide for a quantitative approach, but the rest of the article focuses on a qualitative analysis.
Th e quantitative approach is useful if the researcher seeks to measure the level and dynamics of political will. Quantitative research answers the question of how strong the pressure from society on politicians is in forcing them to take steps in implementing anti-corruption reforms. To empirically measure this aspect, we suggest disaggregating the concept of political will into its component elements in order to operationalize it and develop a system of indicators for empirical measurement. Analogous to the approach proposed by Malena, we represent the concept of political will of the population as the sum of political want, political can, and political must: -Political want denotes the presence among people of a desire to infl uence policy and monitor the activity of political institutions. A patron-oriented consciousness denotes a high level of interest in conducting reforms, being informed about the course of the reforms (including actively seeking out information), and a willingness to participate in the processes of their implementation. In contrast to a patron-oriented position is a client position, which is characterized by the absence of political interest, a low and passive level of being informed, and a dominating desire to receive something from the state and elected offi cials -analogous to the electorate of a clientelistic party (Hale, 2014 ). -Political can denotes recognition of the ability to monitor the activity of the political establishment, including an eff ort to replace elected offi cials, if they do not answer the desires of the population, do not implement their campaign promises, and do not conduct the necessary anti-corruption reforms. A patron-oriented position along this parameter expresses a high level of confi dence in their ability to infl uence the authorities and the eff ectiveness of the work of the democratic institutions and instruments of accountability. A client position appears in one's recognition of one's own political powerlessness and inability to infl uence the authorities in adopting decisions and conducting reforms.
-Political must is recognition of one's civic responsibility, viewing oneself as a part of society, which is a political subject, wielding power, and not an object of political manipulations. A patron-oriented position in this parameter is expressed in recognizing the necessity of holding elected offi cials accountable. An important condition of political must is trust in political institutions and the state, which is expressed by actively participating in political elections. Following this procedure of disaggregation, researchers can evaluate weak and strong aspects of political will, trace the dynamics of specifi c parameters, and compare aggregate and individual indicators of political will in regional units and in various social groups. Th is analytical scheme is a fi rst step on the path to developing an instrument for quantitative research. Th e choice of empirical indicators, the format of the questionnaire, the specifi c questions asked, and the measurement scales used to defi ne the further development of the survey methodology.
In contrast to the quantitative approach, which seeks to measure the strength and dynamics of political will, the qualitative approach is designed to answer the question of how political will is constructed, which factors infl uence its change, and which manifestations of political will it is possible to fi nd in the narratives of ordinary citizens. In such qualitative research, the guides for conducting interviews or focus groups should be directed toward ascertaining the character of how citizens understand their positions as political actors -the desire, ability and need to infl uence the political authorities, in particular, in their eff ectiveness in realizing anti-corruption reforms. In contrast to quantitative surveys, where the system of empirical indicators and factors is defi ned at the stage of developing the survey instrument, in qualitative research, the defi nition of these indicators from the views of the citizens themselves is eff ectively the fi nal result of the analysis. As an example of this type of qualitative research for analyzing political will, we look at the empirical data collected in the course of fi eld research in Ukraine.
Public Views: Analysis of Focus-Group Discussions
In this section, we will analyze the transcripts of 14 focus-group discussions that were conducted in April/May 2015 within the framework of an USAID project on everyday corruption in Ukraine. Th e focus groups were held in three large Ukrainian cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv and L'viv) and the small town of Korostyshev in Zhitomir region. In each city, focus groups brought together men and women of diff erent ages representing diff erent socio-professional groups. Th e focus group participants did not work in NGOs, for the government, or in journalism and they were not political party activists. Although these focus groups were not purposely designed to reveal the participants' desire, capability or necessity to infl uence elected politicians, this material can be (at least partially) used for the purposes of our study. During the discussions people expressed their attitudes towards the new political leadership and assessed the changes in the country's development aft er Euromaidan. Some of these narrations demonstrate people's perceptions of themselves as political actors and can serve for the qualitative analysis of how political will is constructed and manifested in people's minds. By analyzing focus group discussions, we do not mean to measure political will in Ukraine today, but to fi nd some manifestations or indicators of how people in Ukraine position themselves as political actors, how they assess the changes (if any) in the economy and, most importantly, in their society aft er Euromaidan. An additional task is to determine what criteria people use when evaluating the performance of political leaders and their ability to fi ght corruption.
Th e focus groups produced considerable interesting material characterizing the overall situation in the country, the way that the population views politicians, and evaluation of the level of corruption, among other things. In this section, we highlight only those aspects which characterize, directly or indirectly, the positions of the respondents as political actors. Specifi cally, this is trust in the state and in elected politicians as a necessary prerequisite for political will, the character of assessments of the changes in the economy and society aft er the Euromaidan revolution, and attitudes and readiness to participate in anti-corruption reforms. Accordingly, the most informative for the purposes of our research was oft en not just what the participants in the focus groups said, but how they spoke, what associations they used, and how they positioned themselves in relation to the authorities in their narratives.
Th e level of trust in the state
is one of the determining factors of political will. In the context of low trust in the state, public disappointment (which dominated in all focus groups) is converted into political apathy rather than into bottom-up pressure stimulating political will 7 . In a best case scenario, it is expressed by blaming particular politicians for the economic hardships, which refl ects the clientelistic political culture more than bottom-up pressure on state institutions.
All focus groups demonstrate a generally low level of trust towards the state as well as towards the elected top-level politicians. Th e Euromaidan, unlike the Orange Revolution, involved not only representatives of organized civil society, but wider circles of ordinary people (Onuch, 2015) . Th ese people supported the revolution because they began to believe in the possibility of change, and expected these improvements in their lives immediately aft er the transition in the government. For these supporters, the lack of changes is especially painful:
During the Maidan, we believed strongly, we had strong faith, but now, as more time goes by, we no longer have faith in our authorities. (Galina 1, 53-60, Korostyshev 8 ). Th e growing disappointment with the outcomes of the revolution is converted into mistrust of the new political leadership: "we do not believe in the government, do not believe that we can change something" (Aleksey, 35-40 Kyiv). "People no longer believe. I think that they do not believe or have trust in anyone. (Natalia, 25-45, Korostyshev).
One of the biggest disappointments undermining belief in the possibility of change is that the "same people are still in power. " People do not see any dif- 7 For a discussion of whether trust or distrust leads to political participation, see (Levy & Stoker, 2000 , pp. 486-488). 8 Here and further, the quotations are given in italic; the name of the narrator, the age interval of the focus group participants, and the city where the focus group was conducted are indicated in the brackets following the quotations.
ference between the previous regime and the new political leadership ("I do not see any diff erences between the regime that left and the one in place now" Roman, 18-20, L'viv).
Th e popular assessment of Ukraine's political leadership is strongly negative in each city. One cannot fi nd a single positive narrative in any focus group discussion. People in power are generally seen as time-servers who came into power with the sole purpose "to fi ll their pockets. " Th e most critical of the political leaders are people in Kyiv and especially the young generation:
Th 
viv).
Th ere is a threat that people are already getting so tired of the chaos and uncertainty that they would prefer to give up all together on political will and transfer all decision-making power to a totalitarian leader:
It is possible to elect a good leader who will be a tyrant and take everything in his fi st; then there will not be a bunch of various others… (Dmitry 1) 18-20 Kharkiv).
2. Against the general background of complaints and curses, which characterized perceptions of the authorities usually from a clientelistic position, an interesting exception came in the calls for the need to carry out lustration. In contrast to the complaints and lamentations, the theme of the incomplete (and unstarted) lustrations rang out more like a demand which characterized a patron-oriented position. Against the background of general mistrust in the possibility for successful anti-corruption eff orts undertaken by the corrupt state, the strong demand for a process of lustration and the punishment of corrupt offi cials and politicians does not look surprising. Typically, ordinary citizens do not distinguish between lustration and prosecution and use these terms as interchangeable notions. Th e necessity to replace corrupt politicians and offi cials at the top level was articulated in every focus group discussion by the people themselves (without any encouragement or special questions from the moderator). Th e idea of lustration as such is cheered by representatives of all regions and age groups, however everybody is disappointed by the incoherency and poor mechanisms for the practical implementation of the lustration law. Th e people are especially outraged by preservation of an "untouchable caste" among the top-level offi cials. Participants express the feeling that despite lustration, the same offi cials are returning to the positions they held before the revolution:
We should carry out lustration as a top priority 21-29) . The only positive aspect in trust to the state is that despite the general disappointment in the new political leadership, the dominating perception is that the country is headed in the right direction, even if the quality and pace of changes after Euromaidan are insufficient ("in general, the course is correct"). The assessments vary across region and generation. The most optimistic views are expressed by the citizens of L'viv: "I think that we are headed in the right direction, but are moving very slowly, there are many obstacles, which block movement" (Natalia, 18-20, L'viv). The citizens of the small city of Korostyshev also evaluate the general direction of the development as good: "Little by little. With great strength. Little by little we are moving in the direction that we should be moving. There are many inadequacies, but I think that we are moving little by little" (Sergey, 53-60, Korostyshev). The most negative and even aggressive assessments of the country's development are in Kyiv ("we are going backward" -Tatiana, 21-29 Kyiv).
3. Th e way people evaluate changes in the economy and society aft er Euromaidan can be also quite informative about people's political roles. While in general the progress in the country's development aft er Euromaidan is evaluated as extremely negative in all focus groups, there are essential diff erences in the criteria that people use to assess the changes. Th e majority of the participants evaluate the country's progress mainly through the prism of everyday economic life and growing economic hardships. Th is type of narration was particularly typical for the older generation. Th ey blame politicians for rising prices on gas, electricity, infl ation and a variety of other products.
Unlike the older generation, young people evaluate changes primarily through the achievement of Euromaidan goals: integration into Europe, reduction of corruption, and making the state more transparent: "one of the causes of the Revolution of Dignity was to fi ght corruption. What happened was that the leadership changed but corruption remains. Th ey say a lot in words, but the facts show something diff erent" (Stepan .
Although the assessments of the changes are negative from both points of view, young people demonstrate a more "patron-type" position, when they care about long-term political goals. Notably, young people also seem to be more prepared to suff er economic hardships in favor of long-term positive perspectives. Some express understanding that economic depression is a necessary stage of economic reforms: [18] [19] [20] . 4 . Th e focus groups demonstrated changes in people's solidarity, which is important from the point of view of perceiving oneself as a political actor within society. We can assume that the more people feel solidarity with others, the higher their ability to infl uence the political establishment is. In all of the focus groups, participants mentioned the changes in social relationships and interactions among members of society. However, the assessments of changes are diff erent in diff erent parts of Ukraine. Th us, in all of the focus groups that were conducted in L'viv, people (especially young people) speak of the growing trust and consolidation among citizens aft er Euromaidan. Th ey mention new positive trends in people's interactions, such as friendliness and openness to each other.
Each country that joined the EU recently went through this diffi cult step which
In Kharkiv, in contrast, the changes in social interactions were unanimously viewed as negative. Th e participants pointed to an emerging divide in people's consciousness in recent years "…Somehow relations between people have changed…a year ago there was a sort of solidarity among the people and it was palpable. Now people are divided with one person saying one thing and others saying something else" (Dmintry [18] [19] [20] Kharkiv) . Today people are "afraid to openly express their opinions because they fear provoking confl icts" . However even in Kharkiv, some people also see a growing solidarity among the population, such as e.g., the volunteer movement: "It is surprising. I never imagined such a thing. A volunteer movement. " (Aleksandr, (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) . While the assessments of the level of solidarity diff er across the regional dimension, there is a positive change in people's minds that was unanimously agreed upon by all participants regardless of their age or geographical location. Namely, there is a growing popular self-consciousness and understanding of the people's role in the country's development, which is considered by the informants to be a result (or "cumulative eff ect") of the two revolutions:
Looking . We consider this change in people's minds to be the most important factor of political will in terms of bottom-up pressure on politicians.
All in all, we can assume that although trust in the state is still low among Ukrainian citizens, there is a growing belief in the possibility of changing the state from below. Th is swelling sentiment provides a positive incentive in the development of political will. Th e focus group material demonstrates that people, and especially young people, are no longer satisfi ed with serving as a "business resource" and are beginning to acquire and internalize the role of "principal" in the "principal-agent" model of relationships with politicians.
Infl 
Perception of anti-corruption reforms.
Corruption is seen by all focus group participants as the second most important problem hindering the country's development aft er the war. In general, the anti-corruption reforms are considered by people mostly as "window dressing" -not a real fi ght against corruption. People do not see any serious or sincere desire among state leaders to get rid of it (In my opinion, this is only words, Irina . Th e general feeling is that corruption remains the same and is even getting more widespread ("the situation with corruption has become even worse" ; "I think that now corruption is stronger than it was, " Valentina 45-60 Kharkov) " [Corruption] here is even evolving" (Olga 1 Kyiv, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] ; "if you compare us with Russia, here everyone is on the take, whereas there it is only Putin" (Алина .
Against the background of the overall negative assessment of the battle against corruption, important criteria for our analysis include how the population sees the nature of corruption -quotidian corruption, bribe-taking by bureaucrats, and high-level kleptocracy including the theft of state resources -and the extent to which people see the connection between corruption and the general economic development of the country 9 . Despite the limited opportunities aff orded by the material, there are several interesting diff erences between social and regional groups. For example, while defi ning corruption (at the request of the focus group moderator), young Kyiv citizens demonstrated broader and more profound views of corruption and its destructive impact on the economy than their counterparts in other cities. Unlike participants from regions outside the capital who mostly reduced the defi nition of corruption to bribes paid to public institutions and offi cials, participants from Kyiv primarily spoke about high-level corruption associated with oligarchic kleptocracy (stealing from the state), nepotism, "mafi a"-like structures, "the illegal turnover of resources", "lack of transparency", etc.
Another criteria denoting patron-oriented relations with anti-corruption reforms is the representation of one's own abilities in the struggle against corruption. Generally, people expect that it is the state which is supposed to fi ght corruption in the fi rst place. Th e direct question, "Who should fi ght corruption?" in most focus groups gets the direct answer "Th e state. " While most of the participants (especially young people) agree that people stimulate (petty) corruption themselves, the overwhelming opinion is that it is impossible to fi ght the "upper-level" corruption "from the bottom" unless it is addressed by the leadership from above. Nevertheless, practically all participants lacked an understanding that it was possible to exert pressure on the state and politicians through democratic procedures ("Why are we guilty that these oligarchs creep into the Verkhovna Rada?" (Leonid, (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) Korostyshev) . People are poorly informed about the anti-corruption activities of civil society (which demonstrates yet again how NGOs are cut off from the population) and do not know about the possibilities for engaging in the activities of non-profi t organizations. Th ese characteristics can serve as indicators of weak political will and in particular "political can. "
In answer to a direct question about their preparedness to personally participate in the battle against corruption, young people more oft en express a readiness to participate in the anti-corruption battle, but they do not understand what they are supposed to do in order to help. In other words, there is a desire, but no understanding of how to use the opportunities to infl uence the battle against corruption. Th ey need leadership from the state but do not see any coherent strategy of reforms:
It [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Th e popular view among young people is that the best way to fi ght corruption is to do a "total reboot" of the state (Dmitrii 2, .
Th e readiness to participate in fi ghting corruption among the general public is proved by the recent uptick in anti-corruption non-profi t activism (Nashi groshi, etc). Th ere is still considerable potential in people's readiness to support changes, which is especially strong among the younger generation.
7. People's criteria for assessing political leaders can also serve as indicators of political will. Th e assessment criteria for political will and expectations from the political leadership can be divided into two groups: those expressed from a "principal-perspective" and those from an "agent-perspective. " For instance, people with an "agent perspective" would expect political leaders to use elections in order to reward their supporters. People working from a "principal perspective" would hold leaders accountable in a "policy-making sense" (Rose-Ackerman, 2004, p. 9) that goes beyond partisan attempts and means accountability to the public in setting policy. In general, principals should expect a well-functioning state that is accountable to their people. Unfortunately, the empirical limits of our study do not allow us to implement such an analysis here.
Discussion
Th is paper makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. Th e fi rst theoretical contribution is the further development of the concept of political will as it is used in political science literature. Our argument is that political will is not something that is uniquely associated with the qualities of a country's top leader, as is frequently implied by assessments of anti-corruption eff orts. We also reject the notion that political will refl ects a leader's ability to go against his immediate short term interests in order to pursue a bigger vision of reform, given that rationally a leader is unlikely to do that (Geddes, 1996) . To provide a more useful understanding of political will we argue that the concept should be understood within the context of the relationship between state and society. Th e nature of this relationship determines the extent of political will in a society. Moreover, the nature of the relationship is defi ned essentially by whether people feel that they can infl uence the authorities and exert pressure on them to implement anti-corruption reforms.
Second, this paper makes a methodological contribution by laying out a methodology for measuring political will both in quantitative and qualitative terms. We do this by examining the expectations people have for the new leadership. In particular, by asking: Do people think of themselves as patrons or as clients? What do people pay more attention to in their leaders? Do people use client-based criteria or patron-based criteria? (Client-type attitudes towards the political leaders focus on the goods and services the politicians can deliver; patron-type expectations emphasize the ability to carry out reforms that will improve people's lives or make visible changes at the top.) Following up on this type of analysis is a topic for further research.
Finally, by conducting a qualitative analysis, this paper uses the narratives of participants in focus groups to formulate empirical indicators which can be used to measure political will. Also, even though the set of questions for the focus groups was not designed to research political will, the data allows us to make some preliminary assumptions about the evolving contours of political will in Ukrainian society following the Euromaidan Revolution. Th e analysis suggests, in particular, that there is a generational divide in Ukraine and that there are changes taking place in the clientelistic culture among young people. Th e positive changes towards the "patron-oriented" position we describe here are more apparent among young people. Th eir attitudes are diff erent from those of their older countrymen. Interestingly, evidence in Russia also suggests that young people hold outlooks that diff er somewhat from the previous generation, but at the same time they are also generally willing to accept the regime (Mickiewicz, 2014) .
Th e negative tendencies are that trust in the Ukrainian state remains low among ordinary Ukrainians. Nothing has changed in this regard since Euromaidan. People have little regard for the anti-corruption eff orts that have been carried out so far. Given the clientelistic environment in which they live, ordinary people assess anti-corruption reforms and institutional changes through their everyday life or clearly visible changes at the top, such as lustration or the establishment of a new traffi c police force. Th ey do not focus on long-term institutional changes.
We also found regional diff erences among the focus groups participants. Residents in the western part of the country are more optimistic about reform than those in the eastern regions. But the residents of Kyiv were by far the most cynical.
Th e limits of the qualitative approach do not allow us to draw more general conclusions, however, the analysis presented here clearly highlights a variety of changes in the political will among the population of Ukraine, which demand deeper research and explanation.
